DiliCHANCE
successful due diligence in mineral supply chains

D3.5 Pilot case study summary report

Mauricio Winkelried, Zenzi N. Awases, Robin S. Smith, Shahrzad Manoochehri

Funded by the European Union

Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Health and Digital Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Grant Agreement number: 101177460

The DiliCHANCE project

The Challenge

The European Union perceives due diligence as crucial to its economic and sustainability goals. It is needed to secure critical raw materials, support the green and digital transition, and promote sustainable practices that reduce societal and environmental harm.

for more details please visit

www.DiliCHANCE.eu

Our Approach

DiliCHANCE improves due diligence in mineral value chains and responsible business conduct by (a) raising awareness and knowledge of human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) among corporate actors, (b) identifying gaps in HREDD implementation in policy and industry, (c) enhancing due diligence operations with better tools and new solutions, and (d) promoting multi-stakeholder engagement and capacity building.

Imprint

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

Date: October 2026 | version final | Mauricio Winkelried (Solidaridad Peru), Zenzi Awases (AWIMA), Robin S. Smith & Shahrzad Manoochehri (WRFA)

Work package 3 (Improving Business Due Diligence Practices) | Deliverable Number 3.5

Dissemination level: Public

Overview

Executive Summary 5

1. Introduction 7

2. Methodology 8

2.1. Drafting of the principles 8

2.2. Testing in Peru 9

2.3. Testing in Namibia 11

2.4. Scope and limitation 13

3. Results Regional Pilot Case Studies 14

3.1. Peru 14

3.1.1. Findings from engagement with business stakeholders 14

3.1.2. Identification and characterization of local collaboration experiences 15

3.1.3. Characterization of the Dialogue Roundtable-Monitoring Committee experience 16

3.1.4. Discussion of the Principles 18

3.1.5. Linkages between the Monitoring Committee and Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence Processes 27

3.2. Namibia 28

3.2.1. The Namibian regulatory backdrop 28

3.2.2. Discussion of the principles 28

3.2.3. Cross-Cutting themes and recommendations 36

4. Analysis of Results 38

4.1. Peru 38

4.1.1. Lessons learned and recommendations for strengthening the principles for effective collaboration 38

4.1.2. Recommendations for linking local collaboration with corporate human rights due diligence 40

4.2. Namibia 42

4.2.1. Validity of the principles 42

4.2.2. Lessons learned and recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of principles 42

5. Conclusions 45

6. References 48

7. Annex 51

List of Figures

Figure 1. The eight principles for practitioners on implementing effective multi-stakeholder due diligence (Schindall et al., 2026). 9

List of Tables

Table 1. The main thematic areas covered by the commitments related to the Dialogue Roundtable mechanism in Peru 17
Table 2. Lessons learned for the pilot use case study in **Peru** and recommendations for strengthening the principles in the context of this pilot case. 38
Table 3. Lessons learned for the pilot use case study in **Namibia** and recommendations for strengthening the principles in the context of this pilot case. 43

Executive Summary

This study assessed the practicality and effectiveness of the eight DiliCHANCE principles for local multistakeholder collaboration through two pilot case studies in Peru and Namibia. The pilots took different approaches, reflecting their local contexts and levels of stakeholder engagement. In Peru, the principles were applied retrospectively to analyse an existing, institutionalized collaborative mechanism in the mining sector. In Namibia, they were tested forward-looking through a dedicated roundtable to discuss their practicality in the local context. Both pilots examined how the principles can support collaboration among stakeholders addressing human rights and environmental challenges, and identified enabling conditions that can strengthen their effective implementation.

The findings confirm that all eight principles are valid and useful for guiding multistakeholder collaboration. The pilots point to a need for practical guidance on applying the principles, taken the local context into consideration.

Common Lessons

Despite the differences in design, several common lessons emerged from the two pilots:

- Collaboration is an evolving process: Shared problems and objectives must be revisited as circumstances change, through repeated rounds of engagement.
- Collaboration should lead to tangible results: Defining and fulfilling commitments does not necessarily meet community needs, so indicators should capture impact on rightsholders, not only completing the planned activities.
- Effective participation requires more than formal representation: Unequal resources, knowledge and capacity limit influence. Hard-to-reach rightsholders such as women, youth, elders and remote communities need inclusive engagement and capacity-building support.
- Independence and power imbalances need governance solutions: To build trust and strengthen legitimacy, it is essential to ensure the collaboration is not influenced by political powers and conflicts of interest, and it is governed by transparent funding and independent monitoring.
- A gap persists between commitments and implementation: Stronger accountability mechanisms are needed to ensure that commitments lead to action.

Contextual differences

The two pilots focused on different aspects of collaboration. In Peru, the mechanism was not originally designed to address human rights due diligence, so discussions centred on maintaining its legitimacy and effectiveness over time and on better linking locally collected information to corporate due diligence processes. The discussions demonstrated that operational channels for information exchange already exist, but the traceability and use of that information remain a challenge. In Namibia, where no collaboration mechanism was identified, discussions centred on the conditions needed to

establish one. Key challenges were limited corporate willingness to participate and low trust between companies and communities. Participants also noted that the principles, as drafted, are aimed at practitioners and would need to be simplified and translated for stakeholders such as small-scale miners and traditional authorities.

IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

Overall, the principles provide a relevant and meaningful framework for multistakeholder collaboration, however their effectiveness depends largely on how they are applied in practice. This requires balanced participation, independence, adaptation to local contexts and clear accountability mechanisms. The study therefore recommends developing a practitioners' guide tailored to the different stages of collaboration and to local contexts, together with a simplified, translated version of the principles for local stakeholders. The Namibia findings should be validated with company representatives, who were not present at the roundtable, and the Peru analysis will be extended to further cases, with results to be presented in a DiliCHANCE deliverable in 2027.

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been a rapid evolution of what is considered responsible business conduct (RBC) and sufficient human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) by companies operating in mineral and metal supply chains. Today, HREDD is generally defined as the ongoing, risk-based process a company conducts to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for adverse human rights, labour, and environmental impacts in its own operations and supply chains (OECD, 2023; United Nations, 2011). Early, voluntary frameworks and guidance documents, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) of 2011, were designed to help companies improve their practices (United Nations, 2011). However, despite widespread recognition and their contribution to raising awareness and establishing expectations for responsible business conduct, cases of human rights and environmental abuses continued to be exposed and reported (Amnesty International & Afrewatch, 2016; Westby, 2014). The limitations of voluntary frameworks in achieving consistent improvements across industries, has led to numerous mandatory regulations to be introduced in several countries, such as the Dodd Frank Act of 2012 in the United States (Dodd-Frank, 2010), the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act of 2023 (LkSG, 2021), or the European Union Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) (European Union, 2022) and their Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) (European Union, 2024b). These pieces of legislation introduce mandatory requirements on responsible business conduct and aim of holding companies accountable for conducting and transparently reporting on their policies and practices.

Despite the now numerous voluntary and regulatory frameworks and guidelines, companies continue to struggle to implement meaningful and effective HREDD (OECD, 2026). A recent DiliCHANCE study evaluated the level of disclosure of the policies and practices of some of the largest companies working in mineral and metal supply chains, and how they align with the six-step, risk-based approach recommended in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for RBC (OECD, 2018). It found that companies tended to report on early-stage commitments and policies on HREDD but how they are implemented, monitored, and evaluated in practice was noticeably lacking from public disclosures (Ellis et al., 2025). Indeed, these struggles were amplified by the business practitioners themselves, when interviewed about their due diligence challenges and needs (Smith et al., 2026). They directly reported difficulties with the implementation steps of the RBC, particularly risk mitigation, effectiveness tracking, and remediation, along with confusion from regulatory incoherence across jurisdictions, limited resources for risk-based prioritisation of suppliers, and fragmented or non-interoperable traceability systems that hamper data quality and information sharing (Smith et al., 2026).

In practice, it is particularly difficult for streamlining downstream – upstream company interaction and collaborations for HREDD. Downstream companies often identify salient issues at the mineral extraction and processing tiers but lack sufficient leverage to address them (Schindall et al., 2026; Smith, 2026), while upstream mining companies confront root causes at the local level, like poverty, weak governance, and conflict that no single actor in the supply chain can resolve (Schindall et al., 2026). Although some collaborative initiatives exist to address local level due diligence challenges (C4D, 2026; IRMA, 2026; RMI, 2026), many remain global and preparatory in focus with high-risk

locations still lacking locally grounded collaborations aimed at actually mitigating specific salient issues (Schindall et al., 2026). Companies are encouraged to fill this gap through collaborative solutions and improved multi-stakeholder cooperation.

With this background and the findings of these reports in mind, the DiliCHANCE project created practical and effective solutions to these challenges together with business practitioners. This included collaboratively creating targeted and practical principles (explained in Section 3.1 of this report) that can aid in fostering effective due diligence and act as a guide to collective and effective local level multi-stakeholder engagements (Schindall et al., 2026).

To validate the practicality and potential effectiveness of these principles and to get regional, commodity, or sector specific input, two pilot use case studies were conducted, one in Peru and another in Namibia. The DiliCHANCE partners in these regions, Solidaridad Peru and Association of Women in Mining Africa (AWIMA) were tasked with finding existing local initiatives and introducing the principles, to solicit feedback on the ease of their uptake and assess if these can assist in more impactful and effective collaborations. The following sections describe the results of the pilot studies and provide insights into the next steps towards the active uptake of these principles by due diligence practitioners.

2. Methodology

2.1. Drafting of the principles

The principles were designed to guide business, civil society, and government practitioners in implementing local collaborations for the prevention, mitigation and remediation of salient issues in their work, operations or society. To ensure that the perspective of relevant stakeholders was adequately reflected in their development, the principles were designed in a three-phase process: a literature review, bilateral interviews with practitioners, and group consultations with experts. This approach allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of gaps in the variety of multistakeholder engagement methodologies and across a wider swath of existing due diligence initiatives. All interviewees had experience participating in, leading the establishment of, and/or implementing collaborations for due diligence on the local level. For the expert consultation groups, members were chosen such that they represented diverse stakeholders with existing knowledge of the factors that enable successful collaborations at the local level. Figure 1. displays the eight principles for

practitioners on implementing effective multi-stakeholder due diligence. See Schindall et al., (2026) for more details on the processes conducted to draft the prinicples.




Figure 1. The eight principles for practitioners on implementing effective multi-stakeholder due diligence (Schindall et al., 2026).

2.2. Testing in Peru

Research Design: The DiliCHANCE consortium member, Solidaridad Peru, adopted an exploratory, qualitative action research approach based on the analysis of concrete experiences of multi-stakeholder collaboration in Peru. The research design combines two levels of analysis. The first examines how collaboration mechanisms operate, considering their objectives, participants, ways of working, capacity for joint action and monitoring procedures. The second explores their potential linkages with corporate due diligence processes, particularly in relation to risk identification, information flows, the adoption of measures and rightsholder participation.

Business engagement and case identification: The pilot use case in Peru included two forms of engagement processes with business stakeholders and representatives from communities. Leveraging networks facilitated by the Embassy of the Netherlands and the EU Delegation in Peru, the research team initially approached mining companies with relatively advanced human rights due diligence

practices. A two-stage engagement strategy was adopted to facilitate access to relevant experiences and encourage participation in the research.

A central engagement activity was the DiliCHANCE Peru Executive Breakfast, held on 5 August 2026 in Lima, which brought together nineteen representatives from nine mining companies and other business stakeholders. The format provided a safe and confidential setting to introduce the project and its eight principles, engage multiple companies simultaneously, and explore their perspectives and potential interest in participating in the research. Discussions also provided insights into corporate practices for managing human rights risks, the functioning of local coordination mechanisms, and the conditions under which these two areas could potentially be linked. Participants' contributions were synthesized in aggregate form, in accordance with the event's confidentiality rules.

The event was followed by bilateral discussions with participating companies, that had expressed an interest in contributing to the study, to gain a deeper understanding of their experiences and identify potential multi-stakeholder collaboration mechanisms. Cases were purposively selected based on the relevance of the issues addressed, the diversity of collaboration arrangements, the interest of the actors involved and the availability of information for analysis.

This process led to the identification of three local collaboration experiences, described in Section 4.1.2. Given differences in the availability of evidence, this report examines one of these collaboration mechanisms, namely the ***Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee*** experience (explained in Section 4.1.2), in greater depth, while the other two experiences remain at a preliminary characterization stage and will be discussed in a later DiliCHANCE publication (Deliverable 3.6).

For confidentiality reasons, the names of the mining company and other identifying details have been anonymized, as the company had not yet reviewed the report of the case study at the time of publication. The upcoming DiliCHANCE publication (Deliverable 3.7) is expected to include the company's name and relevant case-specific details, subject to its review and authorization.

Research instruments and analytical procedures: To guide the research, case characterization tools, effective collaboration indicators and interview guides for business representatives and rightsholders were developed. Annex I presents a synthesized version of the interview guides used in the research.

The indicators were designed as an indirect inquiry tool: participants were not asked to assess or rate the DiliCHANCE eight principles presented in Section 3.1. Instead, information was gathered on concrete practices, decisions, agreements and experiences. This approach seeks to avoid relying exclusively on interviewees' general assessments of the quality of collaboration.

In addition, the research includes a cross-cutting dimension concerning linkages with corporate human rights due diligence processes. This dimension explores whether the concerns, information and agreements generated through local mechanisms can be connected to corporate procedures for identifying, preventing, mitigating and monitoring risks and impacts.

In the case of the *Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee*, the principles were tested retrospectively, combining a review of historical documents, institutional information and interviews

with business and civil society representatives. The analysis considered both the agreement-building stage and the subsequent functioning of the monitoring mechanism, recognizing the differences between their respective mandates and contexts.

The interpretation of the evidence distinguished three complementary levels:

- Application of the principle: actions, procedures, agreements and decisions that can be identified through documentary sources or other means of verification.
- Participants' perspectives: assessments and experiences gathered through interviews, attributed to their respective sources and distinguished from verified facts.
- Testing findings: inferences drawn by the research team regarding the application, usefulness, enabling conditions and limitations of each principle.

Triangulation across sources made it possible to examine areas of convergence, discrepancies and information gaps. The findings are presented qualitatively, without establishing comparative performance rankings among companies or collaboration mechanisms.

2.3. Testing in Namibia

The DiliCHANCE partner in Namibia, AWIMA, was tasked with identifying existing initiatives, and subsequently testing of the principles in this local context. Their work included scouring references, such as news articles and government documents, and interviewing individuals and companies within the AWIMA network of contacts and collaborators in the country's various regions. This included site visits to two mining impacted regions, discussions with rightsholders, and collecting feedback on local experiences of what, if any, existing multi-stakeholder measures have been implemented. More specifically, discussions were held with representatives from the following organizations:

- Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI): This organization has conducted seminal 2008-2009 research on Rössing uranium workers' health and has direct relationship with affected mining communities in Arandis and Swakopmund regions of Namibia
- Stampriet Aquifer Uranium Mining Association (SAUMA): A community-based organization actively opposing in-situ leach uranium mining in Omaheke Region and representing farming communities whose water supply is threatened
- Erongo Region Small Scale Mining Cooperatives: A cooperative composed of women and men in artisanal mining
- Arandis Town Community: A mining host community nearby Rössing uranium mine that experienced health impacts, asbestos contamination, economic dependence on a single mine
- Uis Town Community: Residents of Uis, a mining impact community in the Erongo Region.
- Institute for Public Policy Research (IPRR): Leading Namibian think tank on extractives governance, which published "Transparency in the Namibian Extractive Sector"
- Nambian NGO Forum (NANGOF) Trust: Umbrella body for civil society
- University of Namibia (UNAM): Department of Geography/Environmental Studies has graduate students researching mining impacts

- The Center for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO): A multinational non-profit organization that contributed to a study on the impact of uranium mining in Namibia

Given the fragile nature of the mining sector and its interaction with local rightsholders, AWIMA encountered severe difficulties in finding initiatives that composed a vast array of stakeholders, as well as a reluctance among individuals to participate in the exercise. Subsequently, there was no collaborative initiative found that was composed of mining companies working directly together with local government, community, or working groups.

Two Namibian projects at different points in the mining life-cycle (the Tschudi Copper Mine (Consolidated Copper Corp, Tsumeb / Oshikoto Region), a brownfield restart, and the Lofdal Heavy Rare Earth Project (Namibia Critical Metals Inc., Khorixas / Kunene Region), a project in the advanced pre-production phase) had been identified in the invitation process as potential grounding cases. Neither company agreed to participate in an interview or an event, so the two projects functioned only as background framing.

To overcome this set back, AWIMA instead organized and implemented a roundtable discussion on 25 August 2026, in Windhoek, that brought together multiple actors working in, involved with or impacted by the country's diverse mining activities. The stated purpose of the session was to introduce the eight draft principles to this audience and test their practicality and effectiveness on-the-ground. The session was organized in such a way where only key stakeholders were invited, deliberately keeping the session small so as to enable a substantive working discussion. The discussion drew on participants' wider Namibian and regional experience.

The session was convened by AWIMA and the Women in Mining Association of Namibia (WiMAN) and moderated by an independent facilitator acting as a neutral chair. The participants represented the following organizations and expertise:

- Namibia Indigenous Miners Association: representing the community and small-scale mining perspectives
- Chairperson of the National Heritage Council: highlighting the importance of cultural heritage in the Namibian context
- Senior mining professional; Independent Mining/Critical Minerals Professional: introduced the sustainability yardstick and the "care" framing
- Exploration geologist with extensive experience of working with major and junior mining companies (Rio Tinto, Trevali, ASX/AIM/TSX-listed juniors); credited with a multi-million-ounce gold discovery; previously operated at Okombahe in the Erongo region.
- Senior mining professional; Owner of a local geological and mining firm with experience in working on cultural and educational barriers, poverty mentality, and measurement of implementation of practices
- A town planner with policy and environmental consultation experience added a planning and public-participation perspective.
- The DiliCHANCE partners from WRFA participated online

As noted above, given the fragile nature of the relationship between mining companies and local rightsholders, no business or mining representative agreed to be present.

At the start of the discussion, the DiliCHANCE partners, AWIMA and WRFA, provided an overview of the international regulatory frameworks on human rights and environmental due diligence, presented the project aims and clarified the design intent of the principles. A neutral facilitator moderated the interaction between the attendants so as to keep discussions fair and open, and introduced the discussion points on a principle-by-principle basis. Each principle was read aloud, and the attendees were subsequently encouraged to discuss the practical applicability and effectiveness of each principle and how it pertained to the Namibian context. Further, participants were encouraged, based on their personal experiences, to contribute additional dimensions they felt were missing from each principle. Where a gap was identified, the group discussed whether it could be addressed within an existing principle when applied in the Namibian context. The convenor's interventions steered the substantive content while the geologist and the small-scale mining representatives grounded the debate in field experience.

2.4. Scope and limitation

The findings of the two pilot use cases in Peru and Namibia correspond to a preliminary stage of the study and should be interpreted in light of the pilot's exploratory nature, the purposive selection of cases and differences in the depth of available information and engagement activities. In Peru, the participation of both business stakeholders and rightsholders made it possible to incorporate relevant perspectives, but does not ensure exhaustive representation of all organizations, communities, authorities or individuals associated with the mechanisms under study.

In Peru, the analysis focuses on the conditions under which multi-stakeholder collaboration could operate more effectively. It does not constitute an environmental or social audit, a certification of good practices or a comprehensive assessment of compliance with legal or corporate human rights due diligence obligations. For these reasons, the findings aim to identify lessons learned, enabling conditions and opportunities for operationalizing the principles, rather than to draw definitive conclusions about the performance of the mechanisms analyzed.

The similar type of limitations applies to the Namibia case, where the absence of business representatives meant that the findings reflect only the perspectives of rightsholders and civil society organizations, hence these need to be tested with practitioners. Furthermore, this event was a single session with limited number of participants during which the principles were tested against cases from participants' own experience, not applied to an existing collaboration. The two projects identified as grounding cases were not represented in the organised session.

It should be noted that the views and statements collected through stakeholder engagement activities in this study, including participation in events and interviews, reflect the perspectives and experiences of individual participants and should not be considered fully representative of the broader region or stakeholder community.

3. Results Regional Pilot Case Studies

3.1. Peru

3.1.1. Findings from engagement with business stakeholders

The discussions held during the DiliCHANCE Peru Executive Breakfast provided insights into six key findings concerning the relationship between local collaboration mechanisms and corporate human rights due diligence processes:

- Among the experiences shared during the event, no multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms explicitly designed to manage human rights risks and impacts were identified. This observation does not imply that such mechanisms do not exist, but rather that they were not identified among the participants consulted.

- Participants acknowledged that the identification and management of human rights risks are generally carried out through companies' internal processes, complemented by predominantly bilateral and consultative engagement mechanisms. Consequently, the collective participation of rightsholders in these processes is not necessarily a systematic practice.

- Participants highlighted that the contribution of local mechanisms to due diligence also depends on companies' internal capacities. Particularly relevant factors include corporate guidelines, senior management support, clearly defined responsibilities and channels for communicating, processing and using locally generated information in risk identification and management.

- Participants recognized the existence of various territorial coordination mechanisms, including dialogue roundtables, monitoring committees, framework agreements and development funds. Although these mechanisms are generally not structured around human rights due diligence, they address matters with significant human rights implications, including water, the environment, employment, safety and economic development.

- Participants noted that these mechanisms operate in complex political and institutional environments, where mechanisms with different mandates, participants and incentives may coexist. This diversity can foster complementarity, but may also lead to duplication, tensions over representation and difficulties in coordinating decisions and concrete actions.

- Participants emphasized the need to distinguish between formal representation and the effective participation of rightsholders. Their comments highlighted difficulties in communicating agreements to represented groups, gathering concerns from less-represented groups and ensuring their influence over decisions. These observations underscored the importance of examining representative mandates and the conditions required for informed and independent participation.

Based on these reflections, the Solidaridad Peru research team identified the importance of examining local collaboration mechanisms in light of their original purposes, operational practices and capacities for joint action, without assuming that they constitute formal due diligence mechanisms. Furthermore, the discussions reinforced the relevance of analyzing concrete territorial issues as an entry point for identifying potential connections with human rights and corporate risk management processes. This interpretation represents an inference drawn by the research team, rather than a formal agreement reached during the event.

As mentioned in the methodology section, the findings are exploratory in nature, do not necessarily represent the Peruvian mining sector as a whole, and are presented in aggregate form, respecting the confidentiality of participants' contributions.

3.1.2. Identification and characterization of local collaboration experiences

Following the DiliCHANCE Peru Executive Breakfast and subsequent bilateral discussions with participating companies, several multi-stakeholder collaboration experiences associated with large-scale mining operations were identified, each with different purposes, participants and potential linkages to human rights due diligence. The companies involved in the three experiences participated in the Executive Breakfast and expressed interest in collaborating with the research, recognizing the value of an external perspective on the linkages between their corporate due diligence processes and local coordination mechanisms. As of October 2026, the pilot had progressed along three lines of investigation, selected for their diversity and analytical potential, without seeking sector-wide representativeness:

- *Case A — Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee.* A long-standing, institutionalized multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism responsible for monitoring, verifying and making recommendations on the implementation of a set of commitments arising from an earlier *Dialogue Roundtable*. The *Monitoring Committee* brings together public authorities, civil society representatives and representatives of the mining company, addressing issues related to water management, the environment, employment, local procurement and territorial development. This experience has been investigated in the greatest depth, through document review, historical analysis and interviews with business and civil society representatives. It was therefore selected for detailed testing of the eight principles of effective collaboration (Section 4.1.3).
- *Case B — Coordination around Artisanal and Small-scale Mining.* An experience involving territorial coordination in response to the presence of artisanal and small-scale mining in the vicinity of a formal mining operation. It provides an opportunity to explore challenges related to mining coexistence, formalization and the management of social, environmental and institutional risks. Bilateral engagement enabled progress in identifying this experience, although sufficient evidence is not yet available for systematic testing.
- *Case C — Local Supplier and Contractor Development.* An experience involving a mining company's local development organization focused on strengthening local suppliers and

contractors to facilitate their integration into the mining supply chain. It provides opportunities to examine collaboration around labor conditions, corporate standards and responsible supplier management. This experience remains at a preliminary characterization stage, with insufficient evidence to systematically apply the indicators.

The three experiences represent different collaboration arrangements: monitoring territorial commitments, mining coexistence and supply chain development. This diversity will make it possible to explore the applicability of the DiliCHANCE principles beyond traditional community engagement, including mechanisms that were not explicitly established to address human rights issues.

Given the different stages of progress across the investigations, a comparative analysis is not yet possible. The following sections therefore focus on *Case A*. Further evidence from *Cases B and C* will be provided in an upcoming DiliCHANCE publication (in 2027) to compare the testing findings, identifying common elements, differences and conditions for applying the principles across different collaboration contexts. As mentioned in Section 2.2, for confidentiality reasons, the names of the mining company and other identifying details have been anonymized, as the company had not yet reviewed the report of the case study at the time of publication.

3.1.3. Characterization of the Dialogue Roundtable-Monitoring Committee experience

The *Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee* experience constitutes the main case study of the Peruvian pilot. Its trajectory provides an opportunity to examine the evolution of multi-stakeholder collaboration, from the identification of territorial concerns and negotiation of agreements to the institutionalization of mechanisms for their implementation and monitoring.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF AGREEMENTS

The *Dialogue Roundtable*, convened in the early 2010s, brought together public authorities, territorial representatives, civil society and a large-scale mining company to address concerns related to the development of a mining project and its implications for the surrounding territory.

Water availability and use were central to the discussions, given their importance for the enjoyment of human rights, particularly the right to access water, and for the livelihoods of local populations. From this perspective, discussions addressed the water supply sources planned for the operation, the protection of water reserves, the needs of other water users, and infrastructure and environmental management measures. For the mining company, these issues represented an important dimension of managing risks and impacts on people, consistent with an approach based on respect for human rights. The participation of specialized institutions and the review of technical information helped structure the negotiations and reach concrete commitments.

The process resulted in a set of formally agreed commitments covering water management, environmental protection, employment, local procurement and territorial development, among other areas. These agreements established a concrete basis for organizing responsibilities and monitoring

the agreed interventions. The main thematic areas covered by the commitments are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. The main thematic areas covered by the commitments related to the Dialogue Roundtable mechanism in Peru

Thematic Area	Examples of Commitments
Water availability and use	Agreements concerning water supply sources, the protection of water reserves and the use of water resources in connection with the mining operation.
Water infrastructure and management	Development and assessment of water storage infrastructure, related technical studies and measures to improve water management.
Environmental protection and monitoring	Participatory environmental monitoring, environmental studies, biodiversity conservation and measures to protect ecosystems potentially affected by mining activities.
Local employment and procurement	Commitments related to local recruitment, employment training and the development of local suppliers.
Territorial development	Financing of infrastructure, social programmes and initiatives supporting local economic development.

Institutionalization of Monitoring

Following the negotiation stage, the *Monitoring Committee* was established and assumed a different role from that of the *Dialogue Roundtable*: to monitor, verify and make recommendations on the fulfilment of the original commitments, without becoming a new forum for general territorial negotiations.

According to its regulations, the *Monitoring Committee*'s plenary body includes voting representatives from public authorities, communities and civil society, and the mining company. A public authority chairs the *Monitoring Committee*, while a government institution serves as its Technical Secretariat, with support from other relevant public institutions. The mining company holds a minority of voting seats and does not exercise the *Monitoring Committee*'s leadership functions. Official institutions also monitor the functioning of the mechanism and publish reports on the implementation status of the commitments.

The structure includes specialized subgroups that carry out technical activities and submit proposals to the plenary body, where decisions are made by consensus. This arrangement makes it possible to distinguish the mechanism's monitoring and coordination functions from the implementation responsibilities assigned to the company and other institutions.

Status of Commitments

According to a recent official monitoring report, the commitments fall into three categories: those fulfilled and closed, those requiring ongoing implementation, and those still under implementation. This classification reflects different implementation circumstances and helps identify both obligations

requiring continuous monitoring throughout the mining operation and interventions that continue to face technical or institutional challenges.

One illustrative example is *Commitment X*[1], concerning the construction of a major water storage system. Its implementation has faced delays associated with disagreements over the location of the infrastructure, technical and permitting requirements, and coordination challenges among the institutions involved. Revised implementation schedules have raised concerns among members of the *Monitoring Committee* regarding the extended timeframe required to complete the infrastructure.

For the pilot analysis, a subset of commitments particularly linked to water management was identified, including water availability and protection of water sources, infrastructure, environmental monitoring and conservation of associated ecosystems. This focus reflects the importance of water in the origins of the collaboration, its connection to human rights, particularly the right to access water and its implications for local livelihoods, and the opportunity to examine commitments at different stages of implementation. The selection was based on the research's analytical criteria and does not constitute an exhaustive official classification of the agreements.

The experience presents characteristics that are particularly useful for testing the principles: a long-standing trajectory, diverse participants, formalized operating rules, verifiable commitments and the coexistence of completed, ongoing and pending obligations. Its evolution makes it possible to examine both the conditions that facilitated agreement-building and the challenges that arise during monitoring and implementation. At the same time, it provides opportunities to explore the relationships between technical capacities, representation, governance, resources and the adaptation of interventions.

3.1.4. Discussion of the Principles

The analysis was based on a review of historical minutes from plenary meetings and technical subgroups, official monitoring reports, the mechanism's regulations, a series of press releases issued by regional authorities, and interviews with business and civil society representatives. These sources make it possible to reconstruct relevant aspects of the collaboration and compare different perspectives, although they do not comprehensively capture the views of all stakeholders involved or allow for independent verification of all territorial outcomes. On this basis, the following section examines how the eight DiliCHANCE principles of effective collaboration are reflected in the *Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee* experience, identifying their contributions, conditions for application and limitations, based on the research team's inferences.

PRINCIPLE 1. FOCUS AND SPECIFICITY

Application of the principle: The experience reveals two distinct stages with different degrees of specificity. During the *Dialogue Roundtable*, a broad territorial agenda gradually became focused on

[1] For confidentiality purposes, this commitment is referred to as "Commitment X" throughout the report. This designation does not correspond to its original numbering.

concrete concerns, particularly those related to water management. The incorporation of technical information and expertise enabled progress towards specific commitments. Subsequently, the *Monitoring Committee* assumed a clearly defined monitoring and verification mandate. This transition changed the purpose of the collaboration: from negotiating responses to territorial concerns to overseeing the implementation of previously established agreements, within a dynamic context subject to social, political and institutional changes over the years since their formulation.

Participants' perspective: Representatives of the mining company emphasized the importance of keeping the *Monitoring Committee* focused on the original commitments, referring demands that fall outside its mandate to other mechanisms.

The civil society representative agreed that the *Monitoring Committee* is not a new negotiation forum but emphasized the need to overcome delays and achieve concrete outcomes for the population.

Testing findings: The case supports the usefulness of the principle of focus and specificity. Identifying a concrete issue helped structure dialogue, mobilize technical expertise and steer negotiations towards verifiable commitments. Subsequently, defining the *Monitoring Committee*'s mandate provided it with a recognizable and distinct institutional function.

However, the experience reveals that the specificity of a collaboration must be interpreted in relation to its stage of development. During problem identification, a broad territorial approach may be needed to recognize the relationships between different interests and impacts. During implementation, it becomes necessary to specify obligations, responsibilities and monitoring mechanisms, while also considering changes in the territorial context and the new expectations that stakeholders may develop regarding the scope and outcomes of the original commitments.

A tension also emerges between the specificity of commitments and the broader scope of the original problem. For example, the *Monitoring Committee* may verify progress and obligations associated with *Commitment X*, without necessarily addressing broader regional water security needs related to water availability, distribution and demand. This distinction becomes particularly relevant when the implementation of commitments extends over several years and territorial expectations evolve.

The principle is therefore useful not only for defining what a collaboration should address, but also for recognising its institutional boundaries and maintaining an explicit connection between specific commitments and the problem that originally motivated their adoption.

Principle 2. Relevant Participants

Application of the principle: The participation of public authorities, the company, territorial organizations and technical institutions enabled different interests and capacities to be incorporated into the collaboration. The *Monitoring Committee* institutionalized this participation through representation and accreditation procedures.

Changes in the territorial context have raised questions about the mechanism's composition and representativeness. One example is a request to include the mayor of a district established after the

Monitoring Committee's original territorial configuration. In addition, an interviewee described an episode in which a community changed its position regarding a water infrastructure alternative, although the specific circumstances of this account could not be independently corroborated.

Participants' perspectives: Company representatives regarded the selection and accreditation procedures as elements that strengthen the *Monitoring Committee*'s legitimacy. They described how representatives bring concerns from their organizations to the plenary body and technical subgroups.

The civil society representative acknowledged these procedures but questioned certain practices concerning the autonomy of participants' contributions, requirements for substantiating representative mandates, and the inclusion of new participants.

Testing Findings: The case confirms that the relevance of participants cannot be assessed solely on the basis of their presence or formal accreditation. In long-standing collaborations, it is necessary to examine how representative mandates are established and updated, how the views of represented groups are gathered and communicated, and what conditions enable informed and independent participation. This is particularly important when sensitive territorial decisions are involved. Communities may legitimately change their positions; what matters is that procedures exist to document these decisions and verify that their representatives accurately convey the mandates they have received. Similarly, the emergence of new stakeholders, changes in the territorial configuration or circumstances in which additional groups may be affected may justify reviewing the mechanism's composition based on transparent criteria.

The principle is therefore useful for examining not only who participates, but also whom they represent and how much influence they effectively exercise over decisions. The available evidence does not allow for a comprehensive assessment of the *Monitoring Committee*'s representativeness or corroboration of all the controversies reported.

Principle 3. Mutual Problem Statement

Application of the Principle: Historical documentation shows that a shared understanding of water-related issues was progressively developed through information exchange, deliberation and the participation of specialized institutions. These efforts enabled the participants to move from initial concerns towards a structured negotiation agenda and the adoption of concrete commitments. However, the existence of these agreements does not necessarily mean that all participants shared an identical interpretation of the causes of the problem or the solutions considered.

During the monitoring stage, difficulties in implementing *Commitment X*, concerning the construction of a major water storage system, have led to discussions about its feasibility, location, timelines and alternative water supply options. These discussions illustrate how agreed solutions may face new conditions and expectations as the collaboration evolves.

Participants' Perspectives: Representatives of the mining company identified concerns about water availability and use as determining factors in the origins of the collaboration. Regarding outstanding

commitments, they emphasized the importance of considering their original scope, as well as the technical and institutional conditions affecting their implementation.

The representative of civil society agreed that water-related issues were central but placed greater emphasis on delays in certain interventions and the need to translate technical progress into concrete outcomes for the population. Meanwhile, statements issued by regional authorities reflect a position aimed at preserving the commitment to complete the water infrastructure associated with *Commitment X* while simultaneously promoting interim water supply measures until the infrastructure is completed.

Testing Findings: The experience supports the relevance of the principle in guiding agreement-building. Recognition of a common problem helped organize information, incorporate technical expertise and develop concrete commitments. The case also demonstrates that a shared understanding may emerge through deliberation and joint learning, rather than being a fully established condition from the outset. However, jointly identifying a problem does not guarantee that participants will maintain aligned interpretations of its causes, responsibilities or solutions throughout the collaboration. Implementation difficulties and contextual changes can alter the available alternatives and generate new disagreements. **Accordingly, the principle should not be interpreted solely as an initial activity: in long-standing collaborations, it is important to verify whether a sufficiently shared understanding continues to exist and whether interventions remain connected to the needs that originally motivated the agreements**. The evidence confirms the existence of a common water-related agenda but does not demonstrate that all participants originally shared an identical interpretation of its causes, or that a consensual reformulation of the problem currently exists.

Principle 4. Shared Objectives

Application of the Principle: The commitments arising from the *Dialogue Roundtable* provide evidence of formally agreed objectives that can be monitored. However, their scope varies: some establish specific deliverables, while others involve interventions or responsibilities requiring ongoing implementation. This diversity provides an opportunity to examine the relationship between agreed obligations and the territorial outcomes that participants expect to achieve.

Participants' Perspectives: Representatives of the mining company emphasized that the commitments provide concrete and verifiable objectives, subject to monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

The civil society representative acknowledged actions undertaken by the company, but noted that, in some cases, the completion of studies or specific deliverables, even when formally established as commitments, does not necessarily meet territorial expectations regarding infrastructure and other tangible outcomes.

These differences therefore concern interpretations of the scope of certain obligations and the outcomes expected from them.

Testing Findings: The case confirms the importance of translating general expectations into verifiable objectives, while highlighting the need to distinguish three levels: the objectives of the collaboration, specific obligations and expected outcomes for people and the territory. For example, fulfilling an obligation to prepare a study does not necessarily amount to constructing the infrastructure to which that study could contribute. Similarly, an obligation that has been formally completed may coexist with territorial needs that remain unresolved. This distinction does not diminish the fulfilment of specific agreements but recognizes that their effects may differ from the broader outcomes that originally motivated the collaboration.

The principle is particularly useful when participants clearly define the outputs they commit to delivering, how their fulfilment will be verified and the outcomes they are expected to contribute to. The available evidence allows for an examination of formalized objectives but does not permit conclusive measurement of their effects on the well-being of the populations involved.

Principle 5. Mutual Commitment to Ways of Working

Application of the Principle: The *Monitoring Committee*'s regulations establish procedures for coordination, participation and consensus-based decision-making. Specialized subgroups undertake technical activities and submit proposals to the plenary body for consideration. This division of responsibilities helps sustain operational activities, although certain decisions require formal agreement by the plenary body. The controversies and concerns identified regarding meeting arrangements, representation and outstanding commitments provide an opportunity to examine the challenges that may arise in applying agreed ways of working.

Participants' Perspectives: Representatives of the mining company valued the institutionalization of the mechanism and highlighted that proposals can be collectively discussed and improved. One representative stated:

> *"Many of these proposals have been brought by the company to the collaborative forums, but they have also been received, discussed and improved by the participants, particularly within the subgroups. They have not been imposed by [the mining company]"*

The civil society representative acknowledged the existing rules but questioned their application in certain circumstances. She expressed concern about the influence of political interests on the *Monitoring Committee*'s functioning and the risk of its use for personal or electoral visibility:

> *"We should not use the [Monitoring Committee] to gain political prominence or appear in front of the cameras."*

As an example, she questioned the public attribution of certain achievements to authorities who, according to her testimony, had not been directly responsible for their implementation:

> *"There have been authorities who have published work on their websites as their own achievement when, to my knowledge, it was carried out with investment*

from the mining company in fulfilment of the [Monitoring Committee] commitments."

She also reported difficulties with meeting arrangements and disagreements concerning representation and potential conflicts of interest. These assessments reflect her personal experience and do not constitute independent evidence of political instrumentalization or improper conduct.

Testing Findings: The case confirms that agreed rules can provide an institutional structure for sustaining collaboration over extended periods. However, their effectiveness depends on how they are applied, their legitimacy among participants and their capacity to manage disagreements and power imbalances. An important contribution of this experience is demonstrating that governance tensions are not limited to company–community relations. They may also arise among public authorities, territorial representatives and civil society organizations, each with different interests, capacities and responsibilities.

The participation of democratically elected authorities constitutes a legitimate source of representation. The potential risk arises when short-term political interests or institutional disagreements interfere with agreed procedures and hinder progress in decision-making. The case also reveals a distinction between technical continuity and decision-making capacity. Technical subgroups may sustain activities and prepare proposals while the plenary body faces difficulties, but certain advances require formal approval. This structure provides operational resilience, although it may also generate delays when disagreements persist. The distribution of responsibilities also raises questions about corporate agency. The mining company can contribute information, technical resources and coordination concerning its obligations without assuming the responsibilities of the *Committee*'s Chair or Technical Secretariat.

The principle is therefore particularly useful for examining not only the existence of rules, but also the capacity of multi-stakeholder governance arrangements to sustain cooperation, safeguard participants' independence and translate technical progress into legitimate and timely decisions.

Principle 6. Shared Action Plan for Interventions

Application of the Principle: The agreed commitments provide a basis for organizing interventions, but their implementation requires different levels of technical and institutional planning. While some obligations have been completed or involve ongoing activities, others have required additional studies, permits, inter-institutional coordination and revisions to implementation schedules.

Commitment X illustrates these difficulties. Technical coordination activities undertaken during 2026 demonstrate efforts to address implementation obstacles, although this does not mean that all the alternatives proposed have been formally agreed upon.

Participants' Perspectives: Company representatives highlighted the concrete nature of the agreements and the importance of considering studies, permits and institutional responsibilities for their implementation.

The civil society representative acknowledged technical progress and actions undertaken by the mining company, but expressed concern about delays which, in her view, are also related to disagreements and coordination difficulties among participants.

Regional authorities, meanwhile, questioned the projected timeline for completing the water infrastructure associated with *Commitment X* and proposed interim water compensation measures. A regional government representative clarified that this demand did not imply abandoning the committed infrastructure:

> *"What we are asking for is immediate water for the population while the underlying commitments are being resolved."*

Testing Findings: The experience illustrates that formally agreed commitments do not, in themselves, guarantee effective implementation. This requires continuous operational planning capable of addressing technical requirements, permitting procedures, institutional responsibilities and decisions requiring coordination among stakeholders. These conditions may evolve over time, creating additional challenges for the implementation of the original agreements.

Commitment X illustrates this limitation. In response to extended implementation timelines, regional authorities proposed interim water compensation measures without abandoning the originally agreed infrastructure. However, these proposals should not be confused with consensual adjustments to the intervention plan.

The testing suggests that a shared action plan should include not only interventions, responsibilities and timelines, but also mechanisms for reviewing schedules, addressing obstacles and agreeing on alternative or interim measures when implementation conditions change. The capacity to adapt is particularly important in long-standing collaborations, where fulfilling commitments may require successive decisions by stakeholders with different responsibilities.

Principle 7. Mutual Commitment to Resourcing Plan

Application of the Principle: The collaboration has mobilized financial, technical, institutional and human resources. During the *Dialogue Roundtable*, specialists and public institutions participated, while subsequent implementation involved corporate contributions to projects, studies and infrastructure. At the same time, the *Monitoring Committee* requires resources for coordination, documentation, communication and monitoring. These resources must be distinguished from those that enable its members to participate, including time, travel and the capacity to analyses technical information.

The available documentation does not make it possible to identify a comprehensive *Monitoring Committee* resourcing plan that systematically records contributions from all stakeholders and the mechanisms intended to sustain them.

Participants' Perspectives: Representatives of the mining company described the company's contributions to the functioning and institutional strengthening of the *Monitoring Committee*,

including technical assistance, management tools, and meeting coordination and communication mechanisms.

The civil society representative acknowledged that resources are available for certain operational activities but noted that civil society representatives must personally bear travel and time costs, unlike public authorities who have access to institutional budgets. In her words:

> *"It is a responsibility we take on voluntarily and fulfil, but we do not receive transport support."*

These perspectives demonstrate that funding for the mechanism can coexist with inequalities in the material conditions for participation.

Testing Findings: The case confirms the relevance of the principle, while highlighting the need to distinguish three complementary dimensions of resourcing:

- Resources for interventions: those required to implement the agreed commitments, including technical studies, infrastructure and monitoring measures.
- Resources for the functioning of the mechanism: those needed to sustain coordination, technical capacities, access to information and the *Monitoring Committee*'s operational continuity.
- Resources for effective participation: those that enable different representatives to participate in an informed, sustained and independent manner, particularly when they lack equivalent institutional support.

The third dimension warrants particular attention, as the availability of resources to implement projects and sustain the mechanism does not, in itself, guarantee equitable conditions for participation among its members.

The experience also highlights the distinction between providing financial and operational support to the *Monitoring Committee* and exercising governance responsibilities. Although the mining company contributes to its functioning, it holds a minority of seats on the *Committee* and does not chair the *Committee* or serve as its Technical Secretariat. This separation constitutes an important safeguard for the mechanism's autonomy, which should be complemented by transparent rules governing the sources, administration and use of resources, without assuming that corporate funding implies interference in decision-making.

The testing suggests that mutual commitment to resourcing should be assessed not only in terms of the financial adequacy of interventions, but also in relation to the institutional sustainability of the mechanism and the conditions required for effective and independent participation. The available evidence does not allow for a comprehensive assessment of resource allocation within the *Monitoring Committee* or a determination of whether the identified differences have influenced specific decisions.

Principle 8. Regular Evaluation and Adaptation

Application of the Principle: The *Monitoring Committee* has established practices for technical monitoring and verification of commitments, including participatory environmental monitoring and specialized review mechanisms. Actions were also identified that sought to address implementation difficulties and maintain attention on territorial needs extending beyond certain formally completed obligations. For example, according to the civil society interview, commitments concerning employment and local procurement continued to generate requests to sustain economic opportunities after their formal closure. Similarly, difficulties surrounding *Commitment X* led to new requests for information and technical coordination.

Participants' Perspectives: Company representatives described the evolution of monitoring procedures as a process of progressively improving transparency and verification capacity, in some cases through proposals discussed and refined with other participants.

The civil society representative acknowledged the continuity of technical work but expressed concerns about recurring difficulties concerning representation, meeting arrangements and decision-making.

Her proposals to revise the regulations and establish rules addressing potential conflicts of interest seek to modify governance arrangements, rather than merely the interventions themselves. As she stated during the interview:

> *"We have also asked for clear rules on conflicts of interest. Under the current rules, I believe representation and decision-making are not functioning as they should."*

Testing Findings: The case confirms the importance of regular evaluation and adaptation in sustaining long-standing collaborations. Monitoring and technical review mechanisms help identify difficulties, reconsider interventions and respond to changes in implementation conditions. However, the experience reveals a fundamental distinction between three levels of evaluation and adaptation:

- Monitoring makes it possible to verify the fulfilment status of agreed obligations and identify progress, delays and difficulties.
- Adaptation of interventions enables the review of procedures, timelines and technical alternatives, as well as consideration of complementary measures when circumstances require them.
- Evaluation of the collaboration requires examining whether participation, coordination and decision-making arrangements remain appropriate for achieving shared objectives.

The *Monitoring Committee*'s trajectory provides considerable evidence of commitment monitoring and technical adjustments. By contrast, the available documentation provides less information on periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of the multi-stakeholder mechanism itself. This distinction is particularly relevant because a collaboration may maintain its monitoring and follow-up activities while facing recurring governance difficulties.

The testing suggests that regular evaluation and adaptation should encompass both the agreed interventions and the conditions that make collaboration possible. It is not sufficient to identify

which commitments require adjustment; it is also necessary to examine whether the rules, capacities and dynamics of joint work remain appropriate for achieving the expected outcomes.

It should be emphasised that this research was unable to verify the existence of a comprehensive and systematic procedure for periodically evaluating the *Monitoring Committee*'s effectiveness, or to establish the extent to which the adaptations observed have led to sustained improvements in water-related outcomes for the populations involved.

3.1.5. Linkages between the Monitoring Committee and Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence Processes

The analysis of the *Monitoring Committee* provided an opportunity to explore the extent to which information generated through a local collaboration mechanism can contribute to corporate human rights due diligence processes. Although the *Committee* was not established for this purpose, it monitors commitments related to water, the environment, employment and other matters with potential human rights implications. According to representatives of the mining company's human rights team, operational channels exist through which different departments within the company gather information and concerns raised through the *Monitoring Committee*, review them internally and may incorporate them into their risk management processes.

However, the review of a publicly available executive summary of the mining company's human rights due diligence report revealed limited visibility of these linkages. The document does not mention the *Monitoring Committee* or the commitments it monitors, including those associated with regional water management interventions. Its reference to water focuses on specific community initiatives, such as treatment plants and drinking water and sanitation projects. This absence is particularly relevant given the territorial significance of commitments such as the major water storage infrastructure associated with *Commitment X*, whose implementation continues to face difficulties and delays.

It should be noted that the published document is an executive summary and does not reproduce the full technical report or the company's internal risk matrices. Therefore, the absence of explicit references does not establish that the issues addressed by the *Monitoring Committee* have been excluded from corporate assessments. Nevertheless, the available evidence does not allow for systematic reconstruction of how information concerning territorial commitments is incorporated into the identification and assessment of human rights risks and impacts, what responses it generates or how these are communicated back to participants.

The central finding is that the existence of an institutionalized local collaboration mechanism and operational communication channels with the company does not, in itself, demonstrate systematic and traceable linkages with corporate human rights due diligence processes. The case identifies an opportunity to strengthen and document this connection, without altering the *Monitoring Committee*'s specific mandate or presuming shortcomings in internal corporate processes that have not been verified.

3.2. Namibia

3.2.1. The Namibian regulatory backdrop

Participants situated the discussion inside a fast-moving international HREDD architecture, from the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) (United Nations, 2011) through the US Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank, 2010), the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains (OECD, 2016), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI, 2023), and the more recent EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) (European Union, 2024b) and Critical Raw Materials Act (European Union, 2024a). Namibia's own positioning includes the EU–Namibia strategic partnership on critical raw materials signed at COP27 (MoU, 2022) and subsequent bilateral engagements, including a 2026 China cooperation track (United Nations, 2025).

Against this backdrop the roundtable was framed explicitly as a consultative, forward-looking validation exercise, not an assessment of any specific collaborative initiative or audit of a mining company. The main outcomes of these discussions are summarised in the following chapter.

3.2.2. Discussion of the principles

PRINCIPLE 1 – FOCUS AND SPECIFICITY

Participants Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted but discussions arose around with three dimensions that would be considerations for the specific local context**:**

- Geography must include footprint, downstream impact and duration: Geographic scope cannot stop at the mine boundary — dust, water drawdown, roads, and aquifer effects reach far beyond the license area and continue long after operations cease (a 15–20-year drawdown horizon was cited). Time horizon must be planned inter-generationally, not to the closure date. Namibian law requires licence holders to rehabilitate and remedy environmental damage on abandonment (Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 33 of 1992, sections 54, 128 and 130), and the Environmental Management Act 7 of 2007 links environmental clearance to rehabilitation and aftercare plans. However, the law does not yet set out post-closure monitoring, site relinquishment or the transfer of residual liabilities. The Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy's Namibian Mine Closure Framework (2022) is designed to fill this gap, including through financial assurance, but will only take legal effect through the forthcoming Minerals Bill. In the meantime, industry practice largely follows the Chamber of Mines' voluntary framework (2010). Impacts such as long-term water drawdown can therefore outlast the obligations attached to them.

- Two-tier land governance must be surfaced explicitly: Namibia distinguishes sharply between private freehold land (where consent, compensation and negotiation are with an identifiable owner) and communal or state land (where the counterparties are traditional authorities,

regional councils, line ministries and dispersed community members with overlapping rights). The identification of salient issues changes profoundly depending on which tier applies.

- Heritage and sacred sites are often overlooked in practice: The principles deliberately do not prescribe which issues are salient; that is for each collaboration to determine. Participants observed, however, that in Namibia, where heritage and sacred sites of spiritual and cultural significance are common, practitioners often overlook them or treat them as the lowest priority. Where they are considered, they tend to fall between the "biodiversity" and "social" chapters of impact assessments, where they can be under-weighted relative to more easily quantified impacts. International practice, including IFC Performance Standard 8 on Cultural Heritage (IFC, 2012) and the ICOMOS Guidance on Heritage Impact Assessments for Cultural World Heritage Properties (ICOMOS, 2011), treats cultural heritage as a discrete assessment category with its own methodology precisely to avoid this. Practitioners applying Principle 1 in Namibia should therefore give heritage and sacred sites deliberate attention when identifying salient issues.

Considerations for the Namibian context: Participants identified the following aspects as important to take into consideration when applying principle 1 in Namibia:

- Geography: the focus geography should take into account not only the project footprint but also downstream and cumulative impact zones, and the duration of impacts, which can extend well beyond closure.
- Heritage and sacred sites: these are common in Namibia but often overlooked by practitioners, and warrant deliberate attention when identifying salient issues.
- Land tenure: the identification of salient issues, and of the relevant participants, differs between private freehold land and communal or state land.

PRINCIPLE 2 — RELEVANT PARTICIPANTS

Participants' Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted but discussions arose around additions on inclusion mechanics for the Namibian context. In particular, the discussion focused not on who counts as a relevant participant, but on how the process can **ensure that less vocal and harder-to-reach stakeholders genuinely participate** in a Namibian setting:

- Participants raised the persistent difficulty of ensuring women, youth and elders are actually heard, not merely counted. In many communities, women stay silent in mixed rooms because of long-standing patriarchal norms in addition to women-only rooms because of internalised conditioning about who speaks in "official" settings.

- The Namibia Rural Women's Assembly (NRWA) was cited as an intermediary organisation whose brokering role should be explicitly acknowledged in guidance on stakeholder identification.

- The Kunene / Himba water-consultation gap was cited as an example of relevant stakeholders not being reached at all. The pattern is widely documented. The Namibian's August 2026 analysis "Kunene Has the Minerals. Is the System Ready?" reports that as of 24 June 2026 the region carried 2,438 mineral rights and applications and highlights how Regulation 30 of the Communal Land Reform Act is being applied inconsistently in relation to traditional authorities and communal land boards (Kombonde, 2026). A National Assembly Standing Committee on Natural Resources oversight mission in the Epupa constituency in August 2026 heard that drilling noise had forced villagers to relocate their fields, that community members had been denied consent letters, and that small-scale miners had been shut out by holders of larger licenses (Endjala, 2026). At project level, a recent case in point is the December 2025 Environmental Scoping Assessment for Exclusive Prospecting License EPL 10740 (Congleton Investments (Pty) Ltd), covering exploration approximately 90 km northwest of Opuwo across the Marienfluss and Otjitanda Communal Conservancies in an area where the report itself confirms Himba communities are present and IFC Performance Standard 7 (Indigenous Peoples) applies: documented consultation for the entire process consisted of a single stakeholder meeting on 21 June 2025 attended by six community and conservancy management members, and when stakeholders subsequently requested a feedback meeting on the draft Scoping Report and Environmental Management Plan, the environmental consultants declined, citing “time and resources constraints”, deferring further community engagement to after the ECC and EPL certificates had already been issued (Serja Consultants, 2025).

Considerations for the Namibian context: This principle could be complemented by adding an implementation guidance that "relevant participants" requires culturally adaptive engagement formats, including separate sessions with women, youth and elders where community norms make combined sessions non-participatory; recognise intermediary civil-society organisations (e.g. Namibia Rural Women Association (NRWA)) or the Women in Mining Association of Namibia (WiMAN) as legitimate co-conveners; and require baseline capacity-building so participants understand the framework they are being consulted under.

Principle 3 — Mutual problem statement

Participants’ Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted and discussions arose around if in the Namibian context it can be promoted as a "bias filter."

The room read Principle 3 as the point at which each stakeholder's agenda-driven framing must be surfaced and reconciled into a common description of what the issue actually is "cutting through the biases of everyone's agenda to get to what we are going for." Participants described what reaching a mutual problem statement involves in practice:

- Hearing every relevant view before the problem is defined, so that no single party's assumptions, including the practitioner's own, shape the statement. A geological example illustrated the risk: a single incorrect stone-size value in a resource estimate carried through

to the mine plan and the financial model, can potentially affect the accuracy of subsequent planning and financial decisions. An untested assumption in a problem statement can likewise have local, national or wider consequences.

- Reconciling different explanations of the same problem. Stakeholders may attribute the same event to very different causes. Repeated falls of ground in a mining area might be explained by one person as witchcraft and by another as a technical failure. The process must work through these explanations to agree on the root cause.
- Breaking the problem down into its technical, legal and social dimensions, an approach one participant described from environmental consultations in their town, so that the agreed statement does not neglect any of them.
- Building understanding of each other's roles along the value chain, so that stakeholders stop blaming one another and can see the constraints others face.
- Ensuring balance, so that the most powerful party, "the elephant that pushes the other animals away from the water", does not dominate.

Because each of these steps takes time and may need to be revisited as new information emerges, arriving at a mutual problem statement is an iterative exercise, not a one-meeting deliverable. In the Namibian context, practitioners should plan for it to take shape over several engagements.

Principle 4 — Shared objectives

Participants' Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted, and discussions arose around if in the Namibian context a substantive definitional debate is required.

Shared objectives generated the longest and most interactive discussion of the session, as participants debated what the collaboration's yardsticks should be and how competing yardsticks should be balanced. The facilitator proposed sustainability, development, inclusivity, balance and longevity (a 50-year view) as candidate yardsticks. It was emphasised that 'sustainable development' cannot be imported wholesale: it means different things in a Windhoek boardroom and in an Okombahe or Kunene community. One participant noted that if everyone in the room were asked to write down what sustainability means, each would paint a very different picture. The principle's requirement that participants be explicit about their shared objectives is therefore particularly important in Namibia.

The Stampriet aquifer / uranium case was cited as an illustration of what happens when yardsticks are misaligned across stakeholders. In the Leonardville area of the Omaheke Region, Headspring Investments (a Namibian subsidiary of the Russian company Uranium One) has since 2021 sought to conduct in-situ leach uranium mining beneath the Stampriet Transboundary Aquifer System — the only year-round freshwater source in the arid south-east (Schlettwein, 2025; The Extractor, 2025).Farmers, organised as the Stampriet Aquifer Uranium Mining Association (SAUMA), have

pursued a yardstick of long-term water security; the (then) Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Land Reform withdrew the company's water permits in 2021 on precautionary-principle grounds; the Ministry of Mines has treated the case as a resource-licensing question; and the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Tourism has processed it through environmental clearance procedures(Dlamini, 2024). Participants used the case to illustrate that when four categories of stakeholder each pursue a different yardstick, the collaboration cannot converge on a shared objective. A contrasting case raised by a participant with first-hand experience of uranium-sector engagement in the Erongo Region was the Swakopmund Matters lobby group, cited as an example of well-organised stakeholder mobilisation around a clear yardstick, made effective by drawing on legal and environmental expertise within a networked coastal community. The convenor floated a "tiered method" for weighting salient issues where multiple objectives compete — a national-benefit issue may take precedence, while a local-only issue is resolved at community level. The facilitator reinforced this as a life principle: where consensus is not attainable, decision-making needs a clear tier at which authority sits, or the collaboration paralyses itself.

Considerations for the Namibian context: Considerations for the Namibian context: Principle 4 already requires participants to identify and be explicit about their shared objectives. Participants stressed that in Namibia this requires particular care: widely used terms such as "sustainable development" carry very different meanings for different stakeholders, so the meaning of each objective should be agreed explicitly rather than assumed. The yardsticks raised in the discussion (sustainability, longevity or an inter-generational view, inclusivity, balance and development) may serve as a starting point. Where objectives cannot be agreed across local, regional and national levels, participants saw a need for a clear way of deciding between them.

PRINCIPLE 5 — MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO WAYS OF WORKING

Participants' Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted, while two points were emphasised:

- Face-to-face facilitation is not optional: The session convenor contrasted her own Zambia experience — an initial consultant, engaged remotely from Lusaka, ran a stakeholder consultation via an online SurveyMonkey questionnaire of roughly 15 questions and produced thin, misleading data that did not answer the underlying research question. The convenor then engaged University of Zambia students who conducted the same consultation face-to-face in the field; the resulting report was materially richer and more accurate. The principle should therefore state that in-person consultation is the default mode and that remote instruments (online surveys, questionnaires) are only supplementary.

- Mediation implies opposing views: Principle 5 has to accommodate the reality that some views will not reconcile, "we can agree to disagree, but this is the direction we are working towards", which sets up the tiered decision architecture flagged under Principle 4.

An anecdote from a participant's earlier career in advertising was cited as evidence that face-to-face facilitation is also needed to manage language and connotation. A corporate client had stated that it wanted to "exploit the natural resource" of a country, using the word in its technical mining-sector sense of "use to its fullest potential", but external listeners read "exploit" as a value-laden and negative term, hearing an accusation where none was intended. The point participants drew from this was that a written survey has no way to catch, unpack or repair such connotation gaps in the moment, whereas a facilitator in a face-to-face setting can pause, surface the interpretive mismatch, and correct it before it hardens into distrust. This is particularly acute in multilingual settings where the same term carries different weight in different registers.

Considerations for the Namibian context: Considerations should be given to mutual commitment to **ways of working must default to face-to-face facilitation and mediation at critical decision points**, with remote instruments used only in support; and acknowledge that mediation extends to reconciling irreducibly opposed views by reference to the tiered decision architecture agreed under Principle 4.

Principle 6 — Shared Action Plan For Interventions

Participants' Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted, and discussions arose around if in the Namibian context, shared responsibility depends on a strong foundation of independent expertise, since responsibilities can only be shared meaningfully if the technical information underpinning them is credible.

This is where the deepest structural concern of the session surfaced. One of the participants posed the challenge directly: an expert who is employed by a practitioner has their independence taken away. As an example, they described a mining company's response to a community silicosis complaint being to fund a "second opinion" from a company-appointed doctor. Participants saw this as the type of problem the principle must guard against.

The Bre-X scandal was raised as a reminder that expertise alone is not enough without independent oversight. A certified geologist at the Canadian mining company Bre-X Minerals systematically sprinkled gold dust into drill-core samples from the Busang site in Indonesia, creating the illusion of one of the largest gold deposits ever discovered. The fraud collapsed in 1997 and wiped out approximately US$6 billion in shareholder value, with no one ever criminally convicted (CBC, 2007; Wallis, 2024). The case shows that a technically qualified, certified person can still be captured, corrupt and biased and even sophisticated fraud can evade detection for years.

Participants also described Namibia's specific position. The Geoscience Council of Namibia (GSCN) operates under the Geoscience Professions Act 3 of 2012 and registers geoscientists domestically, but Namibia does not yet have a domestic equivalent of the South African SAMREC code[2] or the Australian

[2] The SAMREC Code available here.

JORC code[3], which set minimum standards, recommendations and guidelines for competent-person reporting on Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves. Namibian technical reports therefore default to SAMREC or JORC for resource statements.

Considerations for the Namibian context: Shared responsibilities include the assignment of independent, certified competent persons for each expertise domain, with express acknowledgement of the accepted certification and reporting framework being relied upon (domestic where available, external professional codes such as SAMREC or JORC.

Principle 7 — Mutual Commitment to Resourcing Plan

Participants' Perspectives: The participants endorsed the principle as drafted, but discussions arose around if in the Namibian context it would be flagged as the highest-risk principle.

The consortium partners asked the room whether Principle 7 is realistic — whether collaborative discussions can in fact end with a clear action plan with defined responsibilities on both the company and the community/stakeholder side. Participants were candid: Namibia has strong policy on paper, but its implementation record is weaker.

Two structural risks were named:

- The "who pays" problem: Whoever pays for the expertise, the investigation or the intervention will typically get the outcome that suits them. A practitioner-funded environmental study is not, in practice, independent — even if the individual expert is professionally certified.
- The accountability-in-between-cycles problem: Who holds a company (or a partner) accountable between the annual reporting cycles, when nothing keeps the collaboration on track? Many action plans are then finalised retroactively near reporting deadlines rather than genuinely tracked.

The room proposed an "accountability buffer", an intermediate accountability layer, distinct from both the practitioner and the downstream buyer, as an addition to the principle.

Considerations for the Namibian context: Mutual commitment to resources requires transparent disclosure of who is funding each element of the collaboration (expertise, monitoring, mediation) and require the inclusion of an intermediate accountability mechanism between the collaboration parties and the downstream customer / regulator.

Principle 8 — Regular evaluation and adaptation

[3] JORC website: https://www.jorc.org/

Participants' Perspectives: The participants **endorsed the principle** as drafted, but discussions centred on whether, in the Namibian context the principle should be qualified to stress "independence and measurability", so that evaluation and adaptation is carried out independently and judged against measurable indicators**.**

Participants read Principle 8 as the "permission slip" that no collaboration is cast in stone, it can and must be revised as monitoring and evaluation (M&E) evidence accumulates. Two qualifications, however, were pressed hard:

- M&E must be conducted by an independent party: Namibia's current de facto monitoring and evaluation body, the Chamber of Mines, operates in a structure where member companies both fund and participate in the Chamber, meaning it serves simultaneously as a representative body and as an implementing entity. The room's clear preference is for independent M&E by a body that is neither the practitioner nor the practitioner's professional association.

- M&E must be measurable on the ground, not on paper: As indicated by one of the participants: "you can't evaluate what you can't measure." The true measure of success is whether the community actually sees change on the ground and whether the salient issues raised through the process are actually being taken care of. This links Principle 8 back to Principle 4, which asks participants to define shared objectives that focus on outcomes rather than outputs: those outcomes are what should be evaluated. Without ground-level indicators tied to them, participants warned, the principles risk being used 'beautifully' on screens as a tick-box exercise. Participants did not specify indicators; these would follow from the outcomes agreed under Principle 4. The outcomes participants described suggest two kinds of indicator. Others concern whether communities experience the collaboration as meaningful, for example whether they feel heard, whether women, youth and elders took part, and whether they consider their salient issues to have been addressed. These are harder to measure and can be captured only through participatory methods, such as community-led monitoring, perception surveys repeated over time and broken down by gender and age, and community scorecards. Effective evaluation under Principle 8 is likely to need both, defined when the shared objectives are agreed rather than after the fact.

One of the participants added a country-level qualification: if Namibia as a whole had a shared national framework for what sustainable and inclusive mining looks like, the identity of the custodian of the principles would be secondary, everyone would be measuring against the same yardstick. In the current absence of such a framework, an independent custodian is needed.

Considerations for the Namibian context: Regular evaluation and adaptation requires independent M&E by an entity that is neither the practitioner nor a body funded and controlled by the practitioner community; require the definition of ground-level, measurable indicators for each salient issue identified under Principle 1; and require the outputs of M&E to loop back explicitly into revisions of the collaboration plan.

3.2.3. Cross-Cutting themes and recommendations

Beyond the principle-by-principle discussion, four cross-cutting themes surfaced repeatedly and were identified as important factors influencing the effectiveness of the principles.

THE PRACTITIONER-BIAS OBSERVATION

The most consistent finding of the roundtable is that the eight principles as drafted are weighted towards the practitioners. The consortium partners acknowledged that the principles were originally designed with practitioners (companies) as the primary audience, since it is companies that are legally required to conduct due diligence and that convene most collaborations. Participants accepted this design intent but were consistent that the final principles should be rebalanced towards the collaboration counterparties, communities, workers, women, youth, elders, traditional authorities, small-scale miners, and the state, to genuinely reflect a "local collaboration" framing.

As one participant summarised it:

> *The eight principles are pitched at people already at the top of the industry, whereas the buy-in that matters most is with, for example, an 80-year-old chief in a rural region who must give consent for a project. Principles written for practitioners without an explicit translation layer for that chief's context will not deliver the collaboration they promise.*

This observation should be read in light of the composition of the room: no businesses (practitioners) were represented at the discussion. Although several participants brought individual mining-industry experience, none spoke on behalf of a company, and the invited company representative did not attend. The observation therefore reflects the perspective of collaboration counterparties and sector professionals and should be tested with practitioners in subsequent engagements.

Overarching observation: Each principle applies equally to all collaboration parties and should be considered in that light when applied in the Namibian context.

Recommendation: Participants considered that the principles would be effective only if all collaboration parties can engage on equal terms. Proportionate expectations reflecting differing capacity, resources and access to expertise, and capacity-building led by the businesses convening a collaboration, should therefore be taken into consideration when applying the principles. Given that no practitioners were present, this should be tested with them.

LOCAL CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES AND ADAPTIVE ENGAGEMENT

Participants argued that culturally adaptive engagement is not a nice-to-have detail — it is a first-order determinant of whether collaboration can happen at all. Patriarchal community structures, poverty mentality, language and connotation, heritage sensitivities, and the authority of elders all shape

whether "engagement" produces real input or performance. The Kunene / Himba water consultation and, the Okombahe communal-farming context, and the Zambia miners' study were cited as examples of what happens when this dimension is treated as optional.

Recommendation: Participants considered that the principles would be effective in Namibia only if engagement formats are culturally adapted and planned from the outset. Culturally adaptive engagement should therefore be taken into consideration when applying Principles 2 and 5, covering separate sessions where warranted, the use of intermediary organisations, checks on language and connotation, and protocols for heritage and sacred sites.

Independent expertise, checks and balances, and M&E

Independence surfaced repeatedly and across three principles — 6 (shared responsibilities), 7 (resourcing), and 8 (evaluation). The consolidated recommendation is to treat independence as a cross-cutting structural requirement rather than as an implicit expectation of individual experts. Independence surfaced repeatedly and across three principles: Principle 6 (shared action plan, which must be informed by appropriate expertise), Principle 7 (resourcing) and Principle 8 (evaluation). Participants were concerned that independence is currently treated as an implicit expectation of individual experts, rather than as a structural feature of the collaboration.

Recommendation: Participants considered that the outcomes of a collaboration would be credible only if independence is demonstrable. The following should therefore be taken into consideration when applying Principles 6, 7 and 8: certified competent persons for each domain of technical expertise; transparent disclosure of the funding source for each element of the collaboration; M&E carried out by an entity not funded or controlled by the practitioner; and, where domestic reporting codes are absent, an explicit statement of the framework relied on.

Implementation matrix and accountability architecture

One participant’s diagnosis, that Namibia is strong on frameworks and policies on paper, was echoed by every participant. Without a concrete implementation matrix and defined accountability layer, the principles risk joining a long line of Namibian policy documents that are strong on aspiration and weaker on delivery. The "accountability buffer" concept, an intermediate layer between collaboration parties and the downstream regulator or customer, was floated as one way to close this gap.

Recommendation: Participants considered that the principles' effectiveness would depend on each one being translated into concrete deliverables, responsible parties, ground-level indicators, a frequency of independent review and an accountability layer. This should be taken into consideration when applying the principles, starting with the outcomes agreed under Principle 4.

4. Analysis of Results

4.1. Peru

Based on the findings of the action research process, this chapter synthesises the main lessons learned in two complementary areas: strengthening the DiliCHANCE principles of effective collaboration and linking local collaboration mechanisms with corporate human rights due diligence processes.

4.1.1. Lessons learned and recommendations for strengthening the principles for effective collaboration

Testing the eight DiliCHANCE principles of effective collaboration through the *Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee* experience provided valuable lessons for strengthening their practical application. These are particularly relevant to long-standing multi-stakeholder collaboration mechanisms involving previously established commitments and changing territorial and institutional conditions.

The recommendations presented in Table 2 below do not necessarily imply reformulating the principles, but rather refining aspects of their interpretation, operationalization and evaluation. They are derived from a specific experience and constitute preliminary proposals that may be further developed through comparison with other cases.

*Table 2. Lessons learned for the pilot use case study in **Peru** and recommendations for strengthening the principles in the context of this pilot case.*

DiliCHANCE Principle	Lesson Learned from the *Monitoring Committee* Case - Peru	Recommendation for Strengthening the Principle - Peru
1. Focus and Specificity	In long-standing collaborations, purposes and priorities may evolve across the stages of problem identification, agreement-building and monitoring, particularly in response to changes in the territorial context. Furthermore, specific commitments may not address all dimensions of the original problem.	Incorporate a temporal perspective: distinguish the focus required at each stage of collaboration and, in conjunction with Principle 8, promote periodic reviews of the continued relevance of the mandate and commitments in light of evolving territorial needs, without undermining the original agreements.
2. Relevant Participants	The formal appointment of representatives does not, in itself, guarantee legitimate and effective representation of the stakeholders involved. In long-standing processes, territorial and institutional changes may alter who should	Strengthen criteria for representation and effective participation: incorporate guidance for verifying the legitimacy and continued validity of representative mandates, communication with represented

DiliCHANCE Principle	Lesson Learned from the *Monitoring Committee* Case - Peru	Recommendation for Strengthening the Principle - Peru
	participate and whom they represent. New stakeholder groups may also emerge.	groups, and conditions for informed and independent participation. Also consider periodic reviews of the mechanism's composition in response to territorial and institutional changes.
3. Mutual Problem Statement	A shared understanding of a problem may develop progressively and evolve during implementation. Joint identification of a problem does not guarantee that participants will maintain aligned interpretations of solutions, priorities or the conditions required to address it throughout the collaboration.	Treat shared understanding as a dynamic process: in conjunction with Principle 8, incorporate mechanisms to periodically revisit interpretations of the problem, identify emerging disagreements and verify the continued relevance of agreed responses.
4. Shared Objectives	Fulfilling specific commitments does not necessarily meet participants' expectations regarding the outcomes of the collaboration. Delivering concrete outputs (e.g., a technical study for a dam) may coexist with unresolved territorial needs (e.g., increased water availability for the population).	Distinguish three levels of objectives: the purpose of the collaboration, agreed obligations or outputs, and expected outcomes for rightsholders. Promote indicators that differentiate the fulfilment of commitments from the achievement of outcomes.
5. Mutual Commitment to Ways of Working	Regulations help sustain collaboration, but their effectiveness depends on how they are applied and their legitimacy. Technical subgroups may sustain operational progress, although implementation may depend on political and institutional decisions taken within the mechanism's governance bodies. Governance tensions may arise among public authorities, territorial representatives and civil society, beyond company–community relations. Short-term political interests may compromise the mechanism's continuity and legitimacy.	Strengthen multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms: complement regulations with procedures for managing disagreements among participants, preventing conflicts of interest and safeguarding the independence of decisions from short-term interests. Also establish mechanisms that enable technical progress to be translated into timely and legitimate decisions.
6. Shared Action Plan for Interventions	The existence of formally agreed commitments does not guarantee their effective implementation. This requires specific and continuous operational planning capable of responding to changing circumstances, including new technical requirements, permits and	Clarify the components of the action plan: include milestones, responsibilities, dependencies, review procedures and mechanisms for formally agreeing on adjustments or interim measures when obstacles arise.

DiliCHANCE Principle	Lesson Learned from the *Monitoring Committee* Case - Peru	Recommendation for Strengthening the Principle - Peru
	institutional decisions that may arise during implementation.	
7. Mutual Commitment to Resourcing Plan	Resource planning must consider not only the implementation of commitments, but also the functioning of the collaboration mechanism and the material conditions required for inclusive participation by all members. The case demonstrates that representatives may have unequal capacities and institutional support to cover the costs of their own participation.	Distinguish three dimensions of resourcing: implementation of interventions, institutional functioning and effective participation. Incorporate criteria relating to adequacy, transparency, sustainability and independence in the provision and management of resources.
8. Regular Evaluation and Adaptation	The *Monitoring Committee* has institutionalized practices for monitoring commitments and making technical adjustments. However, the available evidence did not allow the research team to verify a comprehensive and systematic procedure for periodically evaluating the effectiveness of the collaboration mechanism itself. Governance difficulties and ways of working that generate dissatisfaction among participants may weaken the mechanism's legitimacy, limit its effectiveness and discourage participation.	Distinguish three levels of evaluation: fulfilment of commitments, outcomes and adaptation of interventions, and performance of the multi-stakeholder mechanism. Promote periodic reviews of governance, participation and ways of working.

Taken together, these recommendations suggest that applying the DiliCHANCE principles in long-standing collaborations requires particular attention to their evolution over time, the legitimacy of participation, the distinction between commitments and outcomes, and the adaptability of governance mechanisms. Rather than introducing additional requirements indiscriminately, the proposed approach seeks to strengthen the **practical guidance** that enables the principles to be applied across different stages and conditions of collaboration.

4.1.2. Recommendations for linking local collaboration with corporate human rights due diligence

The findings of the pilot in Peru suggest that local collaboration mechanisms can generate information relevant to human rights due diligence, even when they were not explicitly established for this purpose. However, their contribution depends on companies having procedures in place to recognize, assess and use this information in managing risks and impacts.

Based on the analysis presented in Section 5.1.1, four recommendations are proposed to strengthen these linkages. They reflect opportunities for improvement identified by the research team and do not

imply that the proposed procedures are necessarily absent from the mining company's internal processes; rather, their linkages and traceability could not be comprehensively verified based on the available evidence.

Recognize the relevance of territorial issues to human rights

Identify the potential human rights implications of issues addressed through local mechanisms, even when they are expressed in terms of infrastructure commitments, environmental management or territorial development. This assessment should consider risks and impacts on rightsholders, without assuming that every territorial commitment automatically constitutes a corporate due diligence obligation.

Strengthen traceability between local information and corporate systems

Establish procedures to identify which concerns, alerts and implementation difficulties arising from local mechanisms are received by the company. This includes information obtained directly through stakeholder engagement as well as information provided through suppliers and other business partners along the supply chain. The procedure should define how the relevance of such information to human rights is assessed and, where appropriate, how they are incorporated into risk matrices and other corporate management tools.

Link territorial information to clear responsibilities and concrete responses

Define the corporate functions responsible for analyzing identified issues and determining whether they require prevention, mitigation, monitoring or other measures. These linkages should make it possible to understand not only how information flows, but also what decisions it informs and how their effectiveness is assessed.

Strengthen feedback mechanisms and communication of outcomes

Promote mechanisms to inform participants in local collaboration forums how their concerns have been considered, what responses have been adopted and what progress or limitations have been identified. Furthermore, improve the visibility of these contributions in due diligence accountability and reporting mechanisms, while respecting confidentiality and relevance considerations.

These recommendations do not seek to modify the mandates or responsibilities of local collaboration mechanisms, but rather to strengthen their linkages with corporate human rights due diligence processes. The aim is to make better use of existing information and collaborative practices while preserving the autonomy of these mechanisms and recognizing that companies remain responsible for assessing the risks and impacts associated with their activities and business relationships, adopting appropriate measures and monitoring their outcomes.

In this regard, effective local collaboration constitutes a potentially enabling condition for human rights due diligence. However, its contribution depends on the existence of institutional linkages and

procedures capable of translating territorial information into informed and verifiable corporate decisions.

4.2. Namibia

The purpose of the Namibia pilot was to test whether the DiliCHANCE principles are valid in the Namibian context and whether they would be effective in practice as a solution to the gap between identifying human rights and environmental issues and acting on them. This section analyses the roundtable's findings against those two questions.

4.2.1. Validity of the principles

Participants endorsed each of the eight principles as relevant to Namibia. None was considered irrelevant, redundant or misdirected, and no participant proposed removing a principle. The sequence of the principles was also borne out in practice: discussion moved naturally from one principle to the next, with participants observing, for example, that the move from a mutual problem statement (Principle 3) to shared objectives (Principle 4) happened on its own because "these two go very much hand in hand." This suggests that the principles describe a coherent and recognisable process, not a set of isolated requirements.

Where participants questioned the principles, the questions concerned how they would be applied, not whether they were right. The discussion of Principle 2, for example, centred not on who counts as a relevant participant but on how less vocal and harder-to-reach stakeholders can genuinely take part.

4.2.2. Lessons learned and recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of principles

While participants at the Namibia Roundtable endorsed all principles, they highlighted several conditions that would support their effective implementation in the Namibian context. A synthesis of the discussions and recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of the principles is summarised in Table 3. The recommendations presented in this table do not imply reformulating the principles, but rather taking into consideration outlined specificity when applying them in Namibian context. They derive from a single roundtable without business participation and constitute preliminary proposals to be tested with practitioners and compared with other case studies.

*Table 3. Lessons learned for the pilot use case study in **Namibia** and recommendations for strengthening the principles in the context of this pilot case.*

DiliCHANCE Principle	Lesson Learned from the *Stakeholder Roundtable* - Namibia	Recommendation for Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Principles - Namibia
1. Focus and Specificity	Geographic scope cannot be limited to the mine borders: dust, water contamination or aquifer effects reach far beyond the license area and continue long after operations end. The identification of salient issues and of relevant stakeholders differs between private freehold land and communal or state land. Heritage and sacred sites are common but often overlooked or treated as the lowest priority.	Take into account not only the immediate project footprint but also downstream and cumulative impact zones and the duration of impacts, which can extend beyond the mine closure. Distinguish between freehold and communal or state land when identifying salient issues and the relevant participants. Give heritage and sacred sites deliberate attention as an important assessment category.
2. Relevant Participants	In Namibia, the main difficulty is not identifying relevant participants but making sure that women, youth, elders and other hard-to-reach groups are heard and considered, not just counted.	Provide practical guidance on adapting engagement approaches to local cultural contexts, including organizing separate sessions with women, youth and elders where their views may not be effectively heard in joint discussions. Furthermore, facilitate the involvement of intermediary organisations as legitimate co-conveners to support inclusive dialogue. Emphasize the importance of providing basic capacity-building to ensure that all participants understand the framework and processes in which they are invited to engage.
3. Mutual Problem Statement	In defining a shared problem statement, it is crucial to identify and address different stakeholder perspectives and potential biases. Stakeholders may have different interpretations of the same issue, while power imbalances can influence how the problem is defined.	Plan to develop a shared problem statement through an iterative process involving several stakeholder engagements. This should include considering all relevant perspectives, addressing different interpretations of the problem, examining its technical, legal and social dimensions, strengthening mutual understanding of stakeholders' roles along the value chain.

DiliCHANCE Principle	Lesson Learned from the *Stakeholder Roundtable* - Namibia	Recommendation for Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Principles - Namibia
4. Shared Objectives	Concepts such as sustainable development may be understood and interpreted differently by stakeholders, depending on their local contexts and priorities. These differences can make it difficult to reach a shared understanding and common objectives for collaboration.	Emphasise the importance of defining shared objectives based on local contexts and stakeholder priorities. Furthermore, provide guidance on decision-making at different levels when consensus cannot be reached among stakeholders.
5. Mutual Commitment to Ways of Working	Remote engagement methods, such as online surveys, may provide limited or potentially misleading information, while face-to-face discussions allow for better clarification of issues and aligning different interpretations.	Consider the importance of face-to-face facilitation and mediation at key decision-making stages, with remote engagement methods used as complementary tools. Provide guidance on addressing conflicting stakeholder perspectives (as indicated for Principle 4).
6. Shared Action Plan for Interventions	An expert employed by a practitioner loses independence; credentials alone do not guarantee independence. Namibia has no domestic equivalent of SAMREC or JORC, so technical reports default to external codes.	Highlight the importance of involving independent and qualified experts from relevant fields in the development of the action plan. The plan should also clearly identify the applicable certification and reporting frameworks
7. Mutual Commitment to Resourcing Plan	Those who fund expertise, investigations or interventions may influence the outcomes in ways that favour their interests. Furthermore, the lack of accountability mechanisms between annual reporting cycles can result in action plans being finalized retrospectively.	Require transparent disclosure of who funds each element of the collaboration (expertise, monitoring, mediation) and an intermediate accountability mechanism ("accountability buffer") between the collaboration parties.
8. Regular Evaluation and Adaptation	It is crucial to ensure that monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is conducted by independent experts or bodies. An M&E process carried out by a body that is both funded by and represents the practitioners involved may raise concerns about its independence, and potentially questioning the credibility of the process.	Require that monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should be conducted by an independent entity that is neither a practitioner nor funded by the practitioner community. Furthermore, define measurable indicators to assess results on the ground for each key issue identified under Principle 1.

Participants also indicated where the principles are most and least likely to be effective. The strongest prospects lie with pre-production and mid-tier projects that are still designing their collaboration arrangements, and with operators exposed to EU, OECD or lender requirements. The weakest lie with the small-scale mining tier, which the principles are unlikely to reach without a short, translated field version.

5. Conclusions

The two pilots tested the practicality of the eight DiliCHANCE principles for local multi-stakeholder collaboration in Peru and Namibia and examined what is needed to make their implementation more effective. The pilots differed in design, format and type of stakeholders involved. In Peru, the principles were applied retrospectively to an existing multistakeholder collaborative mechanism, the *Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee*, using desk research and interviews with business and civil society representatives. In Namibia, no existing collaboration involving mining companies, government and communities could be identified, so the principles were tested through a single roundtable with representatives of civil society, community-linked and mining sector professionals, with no business representatives present. Although both pilot cases relate to the mining sector, and the collaborative case in Peru focused on copper extraction, the findings should be regarded as exploratory. As such, they are not intended to be representative of either the mining sectors of the countries concerned or any specific commodity value chain.

Validity of the Principles

Both pilots confirmed the logic and relevance of the principles. In Namibia, participants endorsed all eight as crucial and relevant for multistakeholder collaborations. In Peru, each principle helped to analyze how the existing mechanism formed, operated and faced difficulties. In both cases the proposed recommendations concern how the principles are interpreted and operationalized at local level, not whether they are right. Overall, the findings support maintaining the current structure of the principles while identifying a set of recommendations to strengthen their practicality and effectiveness at the local level.

Common Lessons

Despite differences in pilot design and local context, the following common lessons emerged from the discussions:

- **Collaboration should be considered as an evolving process:** The Peru pilot highlighted the need for regularly revisiting the shared problem statement and mutual objectives as circumstances change. Similarly, participants in Namibia emphasized that defining a shared problem requires an iterative process involving several rounds and formats of engagements.

- **Multistakeholder collaboration should lead to tangible results:** The discussions in Peru highlighted that fulfilling commitments does not necessarily address the needs of local communities. Similarly, participants in Namibia emphasized the importance of measuring

results on the ground rather than on paper. Both cases highlight the need for indicators that assess not only the implementation of commitments but also their actual impact on rightsholders.

- **Representation and effective participation.** The discussions in Peru highlighted that formal representation does not necessarily ensure meaningful participation and influence, more specifically when stakeholders do not have access to equal resources, knowledge and capacity to engage. Similarly, in Namibia, it was highlighted that the voices of hard-to-reach rightsholders (e.g. women, youth, elders and remote communities) should be effectively heard and considered. Both cases highlight the need for inclusive engagement approaches adapted to local contexts, supported by appropriate capacity-building measures.

- **Independence and power imbalances:** The discussions in Peru highlighted the importance of ensuring the autonomy of a collaborative mechanism, addressing potential conflicts of interest and limiting political influence. Similarly, in Namibia, it was emphasized that an effective collaboration mechanism should be based on independent expertise, transparency in funding arrangements and independent monitoring and evaluation. Both cases highlight the importance of addressing power imbalances, already identified as a cross-cutting issue in the principles, through appropriate governance structures.

- **The commitment-implementation gap:** The discussions in Peru highlighted that agreed commitments in a potential collaborative mechanism do not necessarily translate into effective implementation and action. Similarly, participants in Namibia emphasized the gap between existing policies and their implementation in practice. Both cases highlight the need for clear and stronger accountability mechanisms to ensure that commitments lead to tangible results.

Differences between the contexts

The two pilots focused on different aspects of multistakeholder collaboration, reflecting their respective local contexts and levels of experience.

In Peru, the discussions focused on an existing and institutionalized mechanism that was not originally designed to address human rights due diligence. The main questions concerned how to maintain the legitimacy and effectiveness of the mechanism over time and how to better link information collected at the local level to corporate due diligence processes. While the pilot identified existing operational channels for information exchange, challenges remained regarding the traceability of information and its use in corporate due diligence.

In Namibia, the discussions focused more on the conditions needed to establish effective multistakeholder collaboration. The lack of identifiable existing collaboration mechanisms, limited willingness of companies to participate and low levels of trust between companies and communities were identified as key challenges. Participants also emphasized that the principles, as currently drafted, are primarily targeted at practitioners and would need to be adapted to the needs and capacities of other stakeholders, particularly small-scale miners and traditional authorities. This would

require simplifying and translating the principles, as well as providing appropriate capacity-building support.

Implications and Next Steps

The findings from the two pilots highlight the need for "practical guidance" to support the effective implementation of the principles, rather than revising the principles themselves. This could include developing a "practitioners' guide" providing guidance on the application of the principles at different stages of the collaboration and tailored to the local context. Furthermore, a simplified and translated version of the principles could be prepared to facilitate their understanding and application by local stakeholders, particularly small-scale miners.

The findings from Namibia should be further validated with practitioners, more specifically by representatives from companies, who were not present during the pilot. In Peru, the analysis will be extended to Cases B and C (See Section 4.1.2), with the results to be presented in the upcoming DiliCHANCE deliverable in 2027.

Overall, the findings suggest that the principles provide a relevant and useful framework for multistakeholder collaboration. However, their practicality and effectiveness largely depends on how they are implemented in practice, particularly in terms of ensuring balanced participation, independence, adaptation to local contexts and changing circumstances. Furthermore, they highlight the need for clear and stronger accountability mechanisms to ensure that commitments lead to tangible results.

6. References

Amnesty International, & Afrewatch. (2016). *This is what We Die For": Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt* (AFR 62/3183/2016; p. 92). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/3183/2016/en/

C4D. (2026). *Cobalt for Development*. https://cobalt4development.com/

CBC. (2007, July 31). Felderhof acquitted on Bre-X securities charges [Online Newspaper]. *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/felderhof-acquitted-on-bre-x-securities-charges-1.680227

Dlamini, M. (2024, January 22). Sauma warns of water contamination and litigation [Online Newspaper]. *The Namibian*. https://www.namibian.com.na/sauma-warns-of-water-contamination-and-litigation/

Dodd-Frank. (2010). *DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT*. https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf

EITI. (2023). *EITI Standards*. https://eiti.org/eiti-standard

Ellis, B., Gilli, R. S., Suhner, R., Manoochehri, S., & Pein, R. (2025). *Baseline and gap analysis of companies' due diligence policies* (p. 51) [DiliCHANCE Deliverable 3.1]. World Resources Forum, Levin Sources. https://www.dilichance.eu/files/Deliverables/DiliCHANCE_D3.1_Gap-Analysis_28.07.2025_Final.pdf

Endjala, M. (2026, August 12). Miners cry foul over working conditions [Online Newspaper]. *The Namibian*. https://www.namibian.com.na/miners-cry-foul-over-working-conditions/

European Union. (2022). *Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting (Text with EEA relevance)*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022L2464

European Union. (2024a). *Critical Raw Materials Act*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401252

European Union. (2024b). *DIRECTIVE (EU) 2024/1760 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859* (p. 58). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401760

ICOMOS. (2011). *Guidance on Heritage Impact Assessments or Cultural World Heritage Properties* [Guidance document]. International Council on Monuments and Sites.

https://www.iccrom.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/icomos_guidance_on_heritage_impact_assessments_for_cultural_world_heritage_properties.pdf

IFC. (2012). *Performance Standard 8 Cultural Heritage* (p. 6). International Finance Coporation World Bank Group. https://www.ifc.org/content/dam/ifc/doc/2010/2012-ifc-performance-standard-8-en.pdf

IRMA. (2026). *The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance*. The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance. https://responsiblemining.net/

Kombonde, S. L. (2026, August 18). Kunene Has the Minerals. Is the System Ready? [Online Newspaper]. *The Namibian*. https://www.namibian.com.na/kunene-has-the-minerals-is-the-system-ready/

LkSG. (2021). *The German Act on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations in Supply Chains*. https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Internationales/act-corporate-due-diligence-obligations-supply-chains.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

MoU, E.-N. (2022). *Memorandum of Understanding on a Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains and Renewable Hydrogen between the EU and the Republic of Namibia*. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/56b5fdff-bc0e-4b3a-8e0f-6b9fc907617b_en

OECD. (2016). *OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas* (Third Edition). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en

OECD. (2018). *OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct* (p. 100). OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/responsible-business-conduct.html

OECD. (2023). *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct* (p. 79). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/81f92357-en

OECD. (2026). *OECD Responsible Business Outlook 2026: Making Commitments Count*. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/2b15370f-en

RMI. (2026). *Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (RMAP)*. Responsible Minerals Initiative. https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/responsible-minerals-assurance-process/

Schindall, J., Kleinaityte-Elamin, D., Schuster, A., Endl, A., Laabs, E., Monfort Climent, D., & Nouvel Zurcher, C. (2026). *Principles for practitioners on implementing effective multi-stakeholder due diligence* (p. 35) [DiliCHANCE Deliverable 3.4]. Levin Sources, WU, WWF, BRGM. https://www.dilichance.eu/files/Deliverables/DC3.4-principles-final-July2026.pdf

Schlettwein, C. (2025, October 12). Uranium mining in Stampriet aquifer risks pollution, says Schlettwein [Online Newspaper]. *The Namibian*. https://www.namibian.com.na/uranium-mining-in-stampriet-aquifer-risks-pollution-says-schlettwein/

Serja Consultants. (2025). *Environmental Scoping Assessment Study Report: Proposed Exploration Activities on EPL 10740 Northwest of Opuwo, Kunene Region* [Environmental Assessment]. https://the-eis.com/elibrary/sites/default/files/downloads/literature/5790_ESA_EPL%20No%2010740%20located%20northwest%20of%20Opuwo.pdf

Smith, R. (2026). *Beyond Tier 1—Challenges in Meaningful Due Diligence for Mineral Supply Chains* [Deep Dive]. DiliCHANCE Project, World Resources Forum Association. https://www.dilichance.eu/files/Deep-Dives-from-Task-1.2/03_DD-for-1SS_-Step2-Final.pdf

Smith, R., Manoochehri, S., Martinuzzi, R., & Pfligl, R. (2026). *Business needs for the implementation of effective due diligence approaches*.

The Extractor. (2025, October 22). Farmers stand firm against Uranium One's aquifer mining plans [Online Newspaper]. *The Extractor, Mining, Engergy, Construction, and Logistics*. https://theextractormagazine.com/2025/10/22/farmers-stand-firm-against-uranium-ones-aquifer-mining-plans/

United Nations. (2011). *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework*. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. ohchr.org

United Nations. (2025). *UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the People's Republic of China*. https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-05/China%20Cooperation%20Framework%202026-2030%20Results%20Framework.pdf

Wallis, L. (2024, May 19). The mystery of the man embroiled in a billion dollar gold scam [Online Newspaper]. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68987824

Westby, J. (2014, April 24). Rana Plaza disaster: The unholy alliance of business and government in Bangladesh, and around the world. *Amnesty International*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2014/04/rana-plaza-disaster-the-unholy-alliance-of-business-and-government-in-bangladesh-and-around-the-world/

7. Annex

METHODOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS FOR ANALYSING EFFECTIVE LOCAL COLLABORATION IN PERU

This annex summarizes the semi-structured interview guides developed for the DiliCHANCE Peru action research process. The instruments are designed to gather evidence on the functioning of local multi-stakeholder collaboration mechanisms and explore their potential linkages with corporate human rights due diligence processes. The questions are presented in abbreviated form and grouped thematically, preserving the distinct approaches of the original instruments.

A. Interview Guide for Business Representatives

Profile: Business representatives involved in the collaboration mechanism (social performance, sustainability or human rights departments).

Thematic Area	Guiding Questions	Related Principles
1. Focus and Scope	What is the geographical scope of the mechanism, and what issues does it address? How do these issues relate to the company's activities or decisions? What matters fall outside its scope?	P1
2. Participants and Representation	Which stakeholders participate, and how were they selected? What decision-making authority do they have? How are the perspectives of different groups incorporated, and how does information flow between representatives and those they represent?	P2
3. Understanding of the Problem	Is there a shared definition of the problem? How are differences between participants' perspectives recognized and managed?	P3
4. Shared Objectives	What are the mechanism's objectives, and how were they defined? What outcomes are expected for people or the territory? How is their achievement measured?	P4
5. Governance and Ways of Working	How are decisions made and responsibilities distributed? What procedures exist to manage disagreements and power imbalances?	P5
6. Action Plan and Implementation	Are there agreed interventions, assigned responsibilities and timelines? How do communities participate in their design and monitoring? What mechanisms allow interventions to be adapted?	P6
7. Resources and Sustainability	What resources does each participant contribute? Are they sufficient to implement the actions and sustain the functioning of the mechanism? How is participation funded?	P7
8. Linkages with Corporate Due Diligence	How are the human rights implications of the issues addressed identified? What information reaches those responsible for corporate due diligence? How is this information used in risk management, business decision-making and feedback to participants?	Cross-cutting

B. Interview Guide for Civil Society Representatives and Rightsholders

Profile: Representatives of civil society organisations, communities and other stakeholders involved in the collaboration mechanism.

Thematic Area	Guiding Questions	Related Principles
1. Focus and Scope	What territory and population does the mechanism cover? What problems does it seek to address, and how do they affect people? What issues fall outside its scope?	P1
2. Participants and Representation	Who participates, and how were they selected? Are the perspectives of women, young people and other groups heard? How are community concerns brought to the mechanism, and how are agreements communicated?	P2
3. Understanding of the Problem	Do participants understand the problem in the same way? What differences exist between the community and the company? How are disagreements about the causes of the problem resolved?	P3
4. Shared Objectives	What does the mechanism seek to achieve? Did the community participate in defining its objectives? Is it clear what the mechanism can address and how its outcomes are evaluated?	P4
5. Governance and Ways of Working	How are agreements reached, and who monitors their implementation? Are there procedures for resolving disputes? Does everyone have effective opportunities to participate and be heard?	P5
6. Action Plan and Implementation	Are the agreed actions, responsibilities and timelines known? Did the community participate in their design? Can community members raise concerns about their implementation? Which agreements have been fulfilled, and which remain outstanding?	P6
7. Resources and Sustainability	What does each participant contribute? Are the resources sufficient? What conditions facilitate or hinder the participation of organisations? Could the mechanism be sustained without corporate funding?	P7
8. Linkages with Corporate Due Diligence	Are the human rights implications of the issues addressed recognised? Does information from the mechanism reach other departments within the company? Are participants aware of decisions taken in response to their concerns? Is feedback provided?	Cross-cutting

Methodological Note

The tables present synthesised versions of the original interview guides rather than reproducing them in full. The instruments were designed for indirect inquiry, using questions about concrete practices and experiences rather than serving as self-assessment tools for participants. Although the original guides were structured around seven principles, the analysis of the Dialogue Roundtable–Monitoring Committee experience subsequently incorporated regular evaluation and adaptation (P8) as an additional dimension, examined through the triangulation of documentary evidence and interviews.

DiliCHANCE
successful due diligence in mineral supply chains

Coordinated by:
Vienna University of Economics and Business,
Institute for Managing Sustainability
Welthandelsplatz 1A
1020 Vienna, Austria
phone: +43-1-31336-5454
www.DiliCHANCE.eu